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THE EURODOLLAR DEPOSIT MARKET:
STRATEGIES FOR REGULATION
George H. Windecker, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
The legal "independence" of the Eurodollar deposit market' might be
inconsequential except for its large size2 and unregulated character.3 In
1988, the Eurodollar deposit market approached $4 trillion exceeding
the domestic deposit market of the United States.5 Today, the Eurodollar
market finances a growing volume of international trade, and fuels the
economic growth of both developed and less developed countries.6 Eu-
* J.D. Candidate, 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See MARCIA STiGUm, THE MONEY MARKEr 46-47 (3d ed. 1990) (defining
Eurodollars as any United States dollar-denominated deposit in a bank or bank branch
located outside the territorial United States); GUNTER DUFFY & IAN H. GIDDY, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONEY MARKET 7 (1978) (defining Eurodollars as United States
dollars intermediated outside the United States). Commercial banks, central banks,
large corporations, institutional investors, and wealthy individuals make up the deposi-
tors who place money in the Eurodollar market. STIGU,, supra at 46. Eurodollar
deposits are for large sums, mostly exceeding USSI million, therefore, small investors
are excluded. R.B. JOHNSTON, THE ECONOMICS OF THE EURo-MtARKEr 3 (1982). With
some exceptions, Eurodollar deposits consist of time deposits for fixed terms ranging
from one day to five years, although most deposits have terms of six months or less.
STIGtJM, supra at 47.
2. See STIGJlM, supra note 1, at 218 quoting MORGAN BANK, WORLD FINAN-
CIAL MARKET (1988) (estimating that the Eurodollar deposit market equalled
two-thirds of the world's gross Eurocurrency liabilities of US$4.8 trillion, or approxi-
mately US$3.8 trillion at the end of 1988).
3. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 222 (stating that Eurodollars remain outside the
control of any central bank).
4. See supra note 2 (indicating that the size of the Eurodollar market in 1988
reached $3.8 trillion in US currency).
5. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 31 (indicating that the M2 monetary aggregate
of the United States at the end of 1988 amounted to approximately USS3 trillion).
The M2 monetary aggregate equals the sum of all demand, savings, and time deposits
in the United States economy. See hi at 30 (detailing the various components of the
M2 monetary aggregate).
6. See Clive Cook, Fear of Finance: A Survey of the World Economy, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 6, 9 (citing statistics that indicate the large size and scope
of international capital markets and the importance of international capital flows for
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rodollar deposits are essentially unregulated because they are not subject
to reserve requirements, legal limits on the rate of interest paid on de-
posits, or the premiums normally assessed for depositors' insurance
The Eurodollar market's large size, and particularly its unregulated char-
acter, however, produce significant adverse consequences for the global
economy.
The Eurodollar market creates greater volatility and instability in
world currency markets.' The large upsurge in currency trading, relative
to central bank reserves, dramatically underscores the influence gained
by private parties in the international money markets compared to that
retained by the world's central bankers For example, speculation
against the pound sterling in September, 1992, created a monetary crisis
that forced British authorities to withdraw the pound sterling from the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).' °
trade and development, including statistics of annual capital-account balances for West
Germany, Japan, and the United States).
7. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 220-21 (noting the differences in the banking
ground rules in the Eurodollar market as compared with United States banking rules).
8. See ANDREw. CROCKETt, INTERNATIONAL MONEY 31-32 (1977) (stating that
the Eurodollar market contributes to the volatility and insecurity of foreign currency
markets by facilitating efficient transfers of large sums among currencies). See also
HEATHER D. GIBSON, THE EUROCURRENCY MARKETS, DOMESTIc FINANCIAL POLICY
AND INTERNATIONAL INsTABILrrY 44 (1989) (explaining that Eurodollar markets allow
speculators, in a floating rate regime, to arbitrage efficiently between money and for-
eign exchange markets, thereby undermining a central bank's use of monetary policy
to pursue a target exchange rate).
9. See Allen R. Myerson, Currency Markets Resisting Power of Central Banks,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1992, at Al (noting that the US$1 trillion traded daily in the
international currency markets nearly equalled the world's foreign exchange reserves in
June 1992). The capital available in the international money market now rivals that of
the major nations' central banks. Id; see also Allen R. Myerson, Market Place: Agili.
ty Counts in Currency Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at Dl (stating that private
currency traders and investors, not central bankers, now control foreign currency mar-
kets); Walter Wriston, The Decline of the Central Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1992, at 3-11 (explaining that when foreign exchange markets were small, a central
bank's buy or sell transaction, which was large relative to the overall size of the
market, effectively influenced exchange rates).
10. Tracy Corrigan & Emma Tucker, The ERM and Britain: Ouofow of Funds in
Day Put at Pounds 10 Billion, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1992, at 6. The European Ex-
change Rate Mechanism (ERM) is an agreement among ten European countries to
stabilize their currencies' exchange rates relative to the German mark. Carl T. Hall,
Foreign Exchange Terms Explained, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1992, at B2. Each of the
ten ERM nations' central banks buys and sells its national currency to maintain an
exchange rate within a predefined trading range against the German mark. Id. Specu-
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Generally, the Eurodollar market weakens government control over the
economy by allowing private parties to circumvent domestic monetary
constraints." For example, when private parties use the Eurodollar mar-
ket to avoid these constraints, domestic monetary aggregates understate
the volume of domestic credit, thereby reducing their reliability in
guiding monetary policy. 2
The Eurodollar market supports not only legitimate international busi-
ness, but also illicit international activity, such as drug trafficking, arms
smuggling, and influence peddling. The Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) scandal in 1991 illustrates the potential for harm
and abuse within the Eurodollar market system. BCCI operated a
clandestine "bank within a bank" for nearly a decade." This secret
bank used the unregulated Eurodollar market to launder money derived
from illegal drug trafficking. 5 BCCI's secret bank also used the Euro-
lation against the British pound placed such a strain on the Bank of England's re-
sources, that the bank ceased supporting the pound, allowing it to devalue and fall
outside the range determined by the agreement. Id. The Bank of England expended
between one-third and one-half of its US$45 billion reserves to unsuccessfully defend
the pound's exchange rate. Lisa Vaughan & Gail Counsell, Inside Story: The Money
Trade, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 27, 1992, at 19. The Bundesbank, Germany's central bank,
spent DM35 billion to support the pound during the September, 1992 crisis. Wolfgang
Munchau, Franco-German Move to Prevent Third ERM Realignment, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1992, at 1. If the pound recovers from its fall in September, 1992, the
Bank of England will have lost an estimated US$1 billion defending it. Realignment
Merchants, ECONONST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 94.
11. See GIBSON, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that controls such as reserve re-
quirements, interest rates ceilings, and credit rationing do not extend to the
Eurocurrency market).
12. Id at 45.
13. See All Things to All Men, ECONoMIST, Jul. 27, 1991. at 67 (implicating
BCCI's abuse of the Eurodollar market, for facilitating criminal activity by drug traf-
fickers and arms smugglers, and for bribing government officials worldwide).
14. See The Men Wzo Ran BCCI and Their Biggest Victim, SUNDAY TINES. Oct.
25, 1992, at 1 (noting that in 1991 Bank of England governor, Robin
Leigh-Pemberton, told a select committee of members of the British Parliament that
Swaleh Naqvi, a BCCI official, maintained 6,000 secret files giving the details of the
"bank within a bank"). In 1990, BCCI's auditor, Price Waterhouse, first mentioned
the secret "bank within a bank" when it disclosed to the Bank of England that BCCI
concealed "a bad bank within a better bank." Patrick Weever. City Focus on BCCh.
Conning the Old Lady, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 25, 1992, at 41.
15. See Michael Isikoff, Federal Sting Exposes Drug Cartels' Money-Laundering
Methods, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al (explaining the apprehension and
charging of BCCI officials in connection with a successful undercover sting operation
designed to infiltrate the Medellin cocaine cartel's money laundering operations).
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dollar markets to finance illegal arms sales. 6 Finally, BCCI bribed vari-
ous governments' officials worldwide with funds derived from the Euro-
dollar markets. 7
This large and important market for financing international trade and
development would seem to attract efforts at regulation, because it also
adversely affects the world's economic and social order. The Eurodollar
market, however, remains largely unregulated. This article explores the
unique character of the Eurodollar market and why it continues to avoid
BCCI employees were not only aware of the money derived from illegal drug traf-
ficking, but also assisted undercover agents by suggesting alternative banking proce-
dures utilizing the Eurodollar market to avoid detection by United States customs and
law enforcement officials. Richard Donkin, BCCI Staff Accused of Handling Cocaine,
FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1988, at 28.
16. See Paul Abrahams & Neil Buckley, BCCI Used London to Finance US
Missiles for Iran, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at 1 (explaining that BCCI's London
branches financed the export of United States anti-tank missiles to Iran in 1985 dur-
ing the Iran-Iraq war). Arthur Lisman, former chief counsel for the United States
Senate's Iran-Contra committee, verified that BCCI transferred US$10 million to pay
for the secret sale of United States anti-tank missiles to Iran, which were part of the
"Irangate" arms-for-hostage scandal. Id. BCCI opened a $175,000 clean credit guaranty
for Iran to initiate the transaction, and subsequently transferred the funds to various
Midland bank accounts in London to pay for the sale of weapons. Id. BCCI was also
knowingly involved in the transfer of funds from the Central Intelligence Agency to
United States-backed guerrillas in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. London Banks Tied to
Iran Deal: Funds Used in Sale of U.S. Missiles to Tehran, Paper Says, CHI. TRIB.,
July 28, 1991, at C6. BCCI also handled multi-million dollar transactions for illegal
arms controlled by Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal. William C. Rempel & Douglas
Frintz, BCCI's Arms Transactions for Arab Terrorists Revealed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1991, at Al. Ghassan Qassem, a 17 year veteran of BCCI, personal banker to Abu
Nidal and a spy within BCCI for Western intelligence organizations, disclosed that
BCCI officials, knowing that export documents were false, nevertheless secretly fi-
nanced illegal sales of British weapons to Abu Nidal for resale to Iraq and other
parties. Id. Forty-two BCCI accounts in British bank branches were associated with
various arms merchants and terrorist groups. Id. BCCI handled millions of dollars of
transactions between Abu Nidal and guerrillas in Peru. Id.
17. See Richard Donkin, The BCCI Indictments: Global Trail of Bribery, FIN.
TIMES, July 30, 1992, at 6 (explaining that BCCI insiders, Agha Hasan Abedi and
Swaleh Naqvi, bribed various finance ministers, national leaders, central bankers, and
high officials at international and regional organizations, all to increase the flow of
deposits to BCCI to continue covering up losses, and to conceal fraudulent transac-
tions). The list of corrupted officials spans the globe, including central bankers from
Senegal and Nigeria, the treasurer and other officials at the African Development
Bank, import/export officials in the Ivory Coast, and the president and general manag-
er of the central bank of Peru. The BCCI Indictments: BCCI Web of Corruption, FIN.
TIMES, July 30, 1992, at 6.
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regulatory efforts by national governments. The Comment further sug-
gests transnational strategies for regulating the Eurodollar market in the
best economic and social interest of world society. Part I of this Com-
ment discusses the history and mechanics of the Eurodollar deposit
market. Part II summarizes the leading cases and draws conclusions
about the legal underpinnings of the Eurodollar deposit market. Finally,
Part 1I" examines how to regulate the Eurodollar deposit market to clari-
fy debtor and creditor expectations, reduce global economic instability,
and control abuse of the market to prevent illegal or criminal activity.
I. HISTORY AND MECHANICS OF THE
EURODOLLAR DEPOSIT MARKET
Today's Eurodollar deposit market began in response to the hostility
that existed between the United States and the communist-bloc nations
in the aftermath of World War 11".8 During the Cold War, communist
nations placed their United States dollar holdings with banks outside the
territorial United States to prevent the United States Government from
confiscating or freezing those deposits.'
18. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 207 (stating that the Eurodollar market resulted
from the tensions arising during the Cold War); see also EUGENE SARVER, TiE
EUROCURRENCY MARKET HANDBOOK 28-30 (2d ed. 1990) (recognizing that the Eu-
rodollar market originated out of the conflict and suspicion between Communist gov-
ernments and the Western capitalist nations). But see, DUFFY & GIDDY, supra note I,
at 2 (characterizing some accounts of the origins of the Eurodollar market as a "fi-
nancial machination" of the Russians, and disparaging it as one for those "who revel
in international intrigue").
Following World War II and the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. investors
worldwide preferred United States dollars to British pounds. SARVER, supra at 28.
When the pound experienced a thirty-percent devaluation in 1949, and subsequent
smaller devaluations in the years thereafter, this instability highlighted the rising im-
portance of the United States dollar for international transactions. Id. Due to the
heightened attractions of the United States dollar in the early part of the 1950s, the
Communist nations maintained substantial United States dollar deposits in New York.
Id. The Soviets, for instance, earned dollars by exporting gold, diamonds, crude oil,
and natural gas, and used those same dollars to import machinery and grain. Id.
19. See STIGLM, supra note 1, at 207 (advancing the view that, as Cold war
tensions increased, the Soviets feared that the United States might block Soviet as-
sets); JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 10 (claiming that Eastern European banks were
fearful of having their dollar balances in United States banks blocked and held as the
result of Cold War extortions); SARVER, supra note 18, at 30 (arguing that the inci-
dents such as the Berlin blockade, the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese
civil war all lead the Soviet government to fear the possibility of funds being frozen
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Thereafter, the Eurodollar deposit market grew rapidly." During the
1960's, the United States Government implemented various capital con-
trols that spurred the growth of the Eurodollar deposit market.2 In
1968-1969, when domestic interest rates rose above the level that banks
were permitted to pay, both the banks and the depositors resorted to the
Eurodollar market where rates remained unregulated.' During the
1970s, a succession of dramatic increases in crude oil prices greatly
increased both the supply of, and the demand for Eurodollars, further
propelling the market's growth.'
in United States banks). The Soviet Union, after consulting their merchant bankers in
London, transferred their deposits from New York to Soviet-owned banks in Paris and
London. Id. Dollars on deposit with Soviet-owned Banque Commercial pour l'Europe
du Nord, known by its telex name as EUROBANK, came to be called Eurodollars.
Id.
20. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 10-11 (noting that the Eurodollar markets
grew at better than twenty-five percent per annum through the 1970s, and quadrupled
in size between 1977 and 1987).
21. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 210 (explaining that capital export controls
enacted in the United States promoted the growth and development of the Eurodollar
market). In the 1960's, the United States passed three laws which specifically im-
proved its balance of payments and restricted capital flows: 1) the Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax of 1964, which discouraged foreign borrowers from raising money in the
domestic money markets; 2) the Foreign Credit Restraint Program of 1965, which
limited American bank loans to foreign borrowers; and 3) the Foreign Investment
Program of 1968, which restricted American corporations from using domestic dollars
to fund foreign investments. Id. All these measures substantially increased the demand
for Eurodollars, thereby promoting the growth of the Eurodollar deposit market. Id.
22. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 209-20; see GIBSON, supra note 8, at 13-14 (ex-
plaining that Regulation Q, which placed a ceiling on domestic deposit rates, stimulat-
ed the growth of the Eurodollar market).
23. GIBSON, supra note 8, at 16; see JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 24-25 (citing
statistics on international bank lending between 1974 and 1980 illustrating the rapid
growth in the Eurodollar market due to the 1973 and 1978 oil crises). In 1973, the
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) succeeded in quadrupling the
price of crude oil. Id.
Oil exporting countries suddenly found themselves with large balance of pay-
ments surpluses that they were unable to use immediately, and that they subsequently
deposited in the Eurodollar market. JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 26. Countries with
oil-export surpluses were attracted to the Eurodollar market, both because it offered
higher yields than the domestic United States dollar market, and because there were
political benefits to depositing funds in Europe rather than in the United States. GIB-
SON, supra note 8, at 16. The banks receiving these Eurodollar deposits efficiently
redistributed these oil-export surpluses to oil-importing countries through syndicated
Eurodollar loans, thereby spreading country lending risks throughout the international
banking system. JOHNSTON, supra note 1, at 26.
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Eurodollar deposits are transacted either as call deposits,"4 interbank
placements, or Eurodollar certificates of deposit (Euro CDs).'5 Banks
use the Eurodollar market to profit on interest rate movements," drbi-
trage between foreign exchange and money markets,' satisfy reserve
requirements, and fund Eurodollar loans.' Banks pay funds in the
Eurodollar market primarily through the Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ments System (CHIPS)"' or Fedwire 2 Banks, but to a lesser extent,
24. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 225, 1209 (defining a Eurodollar call deposit
as an account which is normally placed by customers of the bank, and not by anoth-
er bank, for which the depositor must give 24 hours notice of withdrawal). A call
account may be for same-day value, seven-day notice, or some other period, usually
less than one month. Ad. Approximately ten percent of all Eurodollar deposits are
placed in call deposit accounts. Id.
25. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 225-26 (defining an interbank placement as a
Eurodollar deposit placed by one bank in another for a fixed time period). The inter-
bank placement market may have accounted for US$2.4 trillion of the nearly US$3.8
trillion Eurodollar deposits in 1988. Id. at 218, quoting MORGAN BANK. WORLD FI-
NANCIAL MARKET (1988). Most interbank placements are for tenors of six months or
less. Id. at 47.
26. See STIGUM, supra note I, at 228-29, 1210 (defining a Eurodollar certificate
of deposit as a negotiable Eurodollar time deposit usually sold in large denominations
by banks to corporations, institutional investors, and other banks). Euro CDs have the
advantage over direct Eurodollar placements and call deposits in that the Euro CDs
can be sold before maturity to another party, giving the instrument greater liquidity.
Ld. at 228. Nevertheless, the Euro CD market is much smaller than the Eurodollar
interbank placement market. ld. at 229.
27. See SARVER, supra note 18, at 335 (claiming that interbank deposits are
created in part to speculate on future interest rate movements).
28. See HEINZ REIHL & RITA M. RODRIGUEZ, FOREIGN EXCHANGE & MONEY
MARKETS 155-60 (1983) (explaining that profits are earned from arbitrage between
foreign exchange and money markets when a disequilibrium exists between the rates
in these two markets). This arbitrage, called a covered interest arbitrage, is one of the
ways a commercial bank's treasury operation earns a profit trading currencies and
deposits. I& at 155.
29. See STIGUM,, supra note 1, at 200-01 (explaining that when a foreign branch
of an American bank receives a Eurodollar deposit, this increases the parent bank's
reserves held with the Federal Reserve Bank).
30. SARVER, supra note 18, at 335.
31. See STIGUM, supra note 1, at 893-95 (stating that the Clearing House Inter-
bank Payments System (CHIPS) in New York processes thousands of Eurodollar trans-
fers daily). CHIPS automated the receiving, clearing, and settling of these interbank
transfers, and handles as many as 150,000 transactions for a total value of US$750
million daily. Id. at 894-95.
As foreign banks originally did not have reserve accounts with the Federal
Reserve Bank of the United States, they cleared their United States domestic dollar
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also transfer funds in-house,33 draw banker's drafts,' issue banker's
payment orders,35 pay funds through offshore clearing arrangements, 6
or issue certificates of deposit.37 Upon payment Eurodollars never actu-
ally leave the United States.38 Rather, reserves held by banks with the
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States are shifted from the account
of one bank to that of another.39
and Eurodollar payments through their correspondent banks in New York. Id. at 205.
Most foreign banks continued clearing their Eurodollar transactions through their New
York correspondents even after they opened reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve
Bank. Id.
32. See SrIOUM, supra note 1, at 1216 (defining Fedwire as a computer system
linking member banks to the Federal Reserve Bank that is used for making interbank
payments of Federal Reserve funds and payments for Treasury and agency securities).
Fedwire routinely handles US$300 to US$400 billion, daily, in transfers between
member banks. Id. at 900. Fedwire clears only one to two percent of all Eurodollar
transactions, however, because almost all the remaining transactions are cleared
through CHIPS. Id. at 888.
33. See STGUM, supra note 1, at 898 (defining transfers in-house, or book trans-
fers, as a transfer of funds from one account to another within the same bank by
internal bookkeeping entries).
34. See STIGtrM, supra note 1, at 893-94 (defining a banker's draft as an official
check issued by a bank); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B.
728, 752 (1987) (defining a banker's draft as a bank's promissory note issued in
favor of a certain beneficiary).
35. See Libyan Arab, 1989 Q.B. at 753 (defining a banker's payment order as a
promissory note issued by one bank directly in favor of another bank).
36. See id. at 753-54 (explaining that offshore clearing house arrangements in-
clude procedures between banks located outside the territorial United States in which
they receive, clear, and settle payments for Eurodollars, or other Eurocurrencies). The
London-based United States dollar clearing is limited to relatively small size transac-
tions, maximum US$50,000, which the clearing house can process on behalf of mem-
ber banks. Id. at 754.
37. See supra note 26 (describing the issuance and advantages of Eurodollar
certificates of deposit).
38. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 200.
39. STIOUM, supra note 1, at 202. For example, if Exxon transferred funds from
Morgan Bank in New York, and placed those funds on deposit with Citibank's Lon-
don branch, Exxon has created a Eurodollar deposit. Id. at 200. Citibank, as with all
United States banks, has only one reserve account with the Federal Reserve Bank, but
maintains separate day-to-day accounting records for each foreign branch. Id. at 200;
[Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 98,732 (letter ruling dated May 13, 1981).
When Citibank London received the funds .it records a Eurodollar deposit liability in
favor of Exxon, and a "due from" its New York head office. STIGUM, supra note I,
at 201. Citibank New York records a "due to" liability to its London branch, and a
corresponding increase in its reserve account with the Federal Reserve Bank. Id. at
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The Federal Reserve Bank generally exempts Eurodollar deposits from
domestic reserve requirements.' Eurodollar deposits also avoid insur-
ance charges assessed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation"
and interest rate restrictions." The government adopted these measures,
in part, to allow United States banks to compete in the Eurodollar mar-
ket on an equal basis with the international banks of other nations.'
Telephone conversations and telex confirmations facilitate the daily
trading of large sums of Eurodollars in the interbank market." Typical-
202. When Exxon orders the withdrawal of funds to be transferred to Citibank in
London, Morgan Bank records a decrease in its demand deposit liability to Exxon,
and consequently, a decrease in its reserve account with the Federal Reserve Bank.
Id. at 201.
The net result of creating the Eurodollar time deposit has been to shift reserves
from the account of Morgan Bank to the account of Citibank at the Federal Reserve
Bank. Id at 202. Thus, regardless of who makes the deposit, which bank receives the
funds, and where the receiving bank is located, the actual United States dollars never
leave the United States. d
40. See Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c)(5)
(1993) (noting that reserve requirements are not assessed on deposits of American
banks when the deposit is payable only at a foreign branch of that bank). The ex-
emption applies to deposits of residents in the amount of US$I00,000 or more and
the deposits of non-residents for any amount, as long as the deposit is payable only
at the foreign branch of an American bank. 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1993).
The Federal Reserve Bank requires banks to hold a percentage of their total
deposits on reserve in accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank; these reserves may not
be lent out to customers. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 1229. The Federal Reserve Bank
uses reserve requirements to expand or contract bank credit in the economy, thereby
allowing it as the nation's central bank, to indirectly control macroeconomic perfor-
mance. DUFEY & GIDDY, supra note 1, at 132-135.
41. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 221.
42. See STIGUI, supra note 1, at 221-22 (stating that as the Eurodollar market
exists outside the control of any central bank, there are no limits or restrictions on
the interest rate set for Eurodollar deposits).
43. See 12 U.S.C. § 604 (1989) (requiring that every national banking association
operating foreign branches maintain independent accounts for their foreign branches
and, through this bookeeping provision, create the inference of equalizing competition).
44. See supra note 25 (estimating that the Eurodollar time deposits outstanding
between banks at year end 1988 was US$2.4 trillion); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728, 741 (1987) ((citing Memorandum of Law of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (amicus curiae), Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v.
Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (indicating that in 1985 approxi-
mately ninety percent of the US$400 billion daily clearing volume of CHIPS settled
Eurodollar transactions); Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,
Multinational Banks; and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 773, 740 (1989) (ex-
plaining that bank money market traders and money brokers negotiated Eurodollar in-
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ly, one bank's money market trader contacts a Eurodollar broker to
inquire about the rates for placing or taking Eurodollar deposits.45 After
the broker quotes the going rate and identifies a potential counter party
in general terms, the bank trader orally accepts the bid and the potential
counterparty. ' Thereafter, the broker reveals the exact identity of the
counterparty, and the broker then contacts the parties by telex to con-
clude the transaction.47 Ultimately, the parties themselves confirm the
transaction by mailing written statements.48
These simple confirmations did not, at least until 1986,4 specify ei-
ther governing law or the place of repayment or collection." Although
in many domestic markets a set of "rules and regulations" govern bank
deposits,"' no such system controls deposits in the interbank Eurodollar
market. 2 Banks contract among themselves for the placing and taking
of millions of dollars in deposits with little more documentation than an
ordinary sales slip. 3
terbank deposits by telephone, evidenced their agreement by an exchange of telexes,
and confirmed it by written advice mailed subsequent to the transaction).
45. Charles J. Scanlon, Definitions and Mechanics of Eurodollar Transactions, in
THE EURODOLLAR 16, 24 (Herbert V. Prochnow ed., 1970) (offering a hypothetical
example explaining the mechanics of interbank Eurodollar transactions).
46. Id. at 24-25.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id.
49. See infra note 122 (noting that in 1986 Manufacturers' Hanover adopted
wording specifying English law to govern disputes).
50. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 740 (stating that negotia-
tions between bank officers for Eurodollar deposits concerned only interest rate and
maturity, while country risk, exchange rate risk, and credit risk were controlled by
limits set by bank management). But see Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A,,
612 F. Supp. at 353 (indicating that negotiable deposits, such as Eurodollar certificates
of deposit, clearly stated which country's laws governed the deposit, and where the
deposit was located in order to give proper notice to a potential transferee).
51. See U.C.C. § 4-103 (1987) (providing for banks to set forth the manner of
making deposits, paying interest, processing checks, and other banking mechanics).
52. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 737, 740 (observing that
few of the UCC rules apply to international transactions, and that the Eurodollar
interbank deposit market reflects one of extreme informality with respect to written
documentation).
53. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia. Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450,
1451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting the written confirmation for an interbank Eurodollar
deposit that stated that the parties specified only the manner and place of repayment).
366 [VOL. 9:1
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I. THE LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
EURODOLLAR DEPOSIT MARKET
The Eurodollar deposit market has spawned lawsuits, primarily when
war, revolution, or other national crises interrupt international monetary
flows.' Depositors have sued their international bankers when Castro
seized power in Cuba," when the North Vietnamese defeated the South
Vietnamese,' when the United States froze the assets of Iran" and
Libya,58 and when Mexico" and the Philippinese imposed exchange
54. John E. Hoffman, Jr. & Rachel E. Deming, The Role of the U.S. Courts in
Transnational Flow of Funds, 17 J. INT'L L. & POL. 493, 496 (1985).
55. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (involving a suit brought by the state-owned Cuban bank
against an American bank to recover an unpaid letter of credit); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981) (reviewing claims
based on expropriation of property following the Cuban revolution); Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that the act of state doctrine bars courts from examining the validity of takings
claims against a foreign sovereign but does not bar inquiry into the validity of extra-
territorial takings).
56. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982) (involving a suit by Vietnamese corporations
against the bank which closed its branch in Vietnam following the communist take-
over); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (holding that the Presi-
dent was authorized, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to
nullify attachments of property in which Iran held an interest and to order transfer of
Iranian assets); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
58. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728 (1987)
(analyzing the claims of the Libyan bank arising from President Reagan's issuance of
an order blocking all property and interest in property of the Libyan government, and
its agencies, then and thereafter within the United States); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank
v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B.).
59. See Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986). cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987) (involving a depositor who brought a claim against a
Mexican bank after the bank paid principal and interest in pesos, at an official rate,
rather than in dollars as agreed by the parties following the Mexican government's
freezing of all foreign currency accounts and ordering interest to be paid in pesos):
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer. S.A.,
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
60. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
on remand, 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), a.Tfd. 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988).
remanded 495 U.S. 660 (1990), afjd on remand, 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2990 (1992).
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controls to stem the outflow of United States dollars from their econo-
mies. The key issue underlying all these cases focuses on whether the
bank or the depositor bears the sovereign riskW ' associated with a Euro-
dollar deposit.' Efforts at rationalizing these decisions and in determin-
ing how to allocate risks between debtor and creditor in the Eurodollar
deposit market prove difficult.63 Nevertheless, these decisions illuminate
the legal structure of the Eurodollar deposit market.
A. WELLS FARGO ASIA, LTD. V. CITIBANK, N.A.
Although many lawsuits involve deposits in foreign branches of
American banks,' few of these involve Eurodollar deposits among
banks or between banks and multinational companies.'
One important case involving international banks, Wells Fargo Asia
Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., occurred in 1983 when the Philippines experi-
61. See REiHL & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 28, at 389 (defining sovereign risk, also
known as cross-border risk or political risk, as the risk that a government might be
unable due to a shortage of foreign exchange reserves, or unwilling for political rea-
sons to allow a natioinal to convert local currency into foreign currency for meeting
its foreign currency obligation). Depositors in the Eurodollar market concern them-
selves with the sovereign risk of: 1) the country of origin of the bank in which the
depositor places his money, 2) the country issuing the currency in which the deposit
is denominated, and 3) the country of location of the bank branch in which the de-
positor places his money. STIGUM, supra note 1, at 226-227.
62. See Hoffman & Deming, supra note 54, at 497 (stating that the fundamental
issue in these deposit cases is the allocation of risks between the parties);
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 735 (stating that allocating the risks
associated with devaluations, freezes of assets, expropriations and debt moratoriums,
all aspects of political risk, marks the key issue between bank and depositor).
63. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44 (examining numerous court
cases and concluding that courts should allocate soveriegn risk in the Eurodollar de-
posit market to depositors and not banks); Hoffman & Deming, supra note 54 (con-
cluding that courts allocate soveriegn risk between depositors and banks based primar-
ily on the parties' expectations).
64. See supra notes 55-60 (citing cases involving disputes concerning deposits in
foreign branches of American banks, or in foreign banks).
65. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (involving deposits of a state-owned enterprise); Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728 (1987) (involving call deposits of a sub-
sidiary of the Central Bank of Libya); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturer's
Hanover Trust Co., [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608 (Q.B.) (involving call deposits of a
subsidiary of the Central Bank of Libya); Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A.,
660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), on remand, 695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(involving an interbank deposit of a private commercial bank).
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enced a liquidity crisis and temporarily blocked the repayment of foreign
currency debts.6 In Wells Fargo, an American bank for the first time
argued that local law in a foreign country prohibited it from repaying a
Eurodollar deposit to an offshore depositor.'
In October 1983, the Philippine government devalued the peso by
twenty-two percent,' suspended principal repayments on its foreign
currency debt for ninety days,6 and imposed exchange controls on for-
eign currency leaving the Philippines." These foreign exchange controls
restricted Philippine banks and branches of foreign banks operating in
the Philippines from repaying their foreign currency deposits'
Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) had accepted two deposits of one million
United States dollars from Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. OVells Fargo) that
were to mature in December, 19832 After the Philippine government
imposed exchange controls, Citibank informed Wells Fargo that it would
repay these deposits when the Central Bank of the Philippines permitted
it to do so.' Although the Central Bank of the Philippines eventually
allowed Citibank to repay a part of these offshore obligations," because
Citibank did not fully repay Wells Fargo in a timely manner, Wells
66. 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see supra note 60 (detailing subsequent
history of the case).
67. Hoffman & Deming, supra note 54, at 502.
68. Manila in Need of Long-Term Loans, N.Y. TWMES Oct. 11. 1983, at D1.
69. See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Philippine Debt Delay Is Granted, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1983, at 35 (reporting that the commercial bank advisory committee had agreed to
the Philippine government's request for a ninety day moratorium on principal debt
repayments).
70. Opposition Group Rejects Marcos Proposal on Talks, WVASH. POST, Oct. 18,
1983, at A9 (reporting that the Central Bank of the Philippines had directed Philip-
pine banks to stop payment on their foreign currency obligations for ninety days).
The Philippine government imposed foreign exchange controls to check the flight of
capital which followed the assassination of opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, as he
deplaned in Manila on August 21, 1983. Colin Campbell, Bankers Say Marcos Must
Act Soon, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 29, 1983, at 35.
71. Memorandum to Authorized Agent Banks No. 47 (Oct. 15, 1983) [hereinafter
"MAAB No. 4T'], quoted in Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660,
665 (1990). The Philippine government issued order MAAB No. 47 requiring all
banks and branches of foreign banks in the Philippines to seek Central Bank approval
prior to remitting any foreign currency funds offshore. Id
72. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946. 947 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
73. Id
74. See id (indicating that the Philippine Central Bank eventually gave Citibank
approval to repay $934,000 out of the $2 million originally owed to Wells Fargo).
1993] 369
370 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
Fargo brought suit in New York.75
On a motion for summary judgment, Wells Fargo argued that New
York law governed the deposit because Citibank's telex confirmation of
the deposit specified repayment in New York.76 Wells Fargo also ar-
gued at trial that even if Philippine law did govern the debt, Citibank
remained unexcused from repaying the deposit on maturity.' After ac-
cepting the parties' invitation to apply Philippine law, the district court
held that Citibank was obligated to repay deposits placed in its Manila
branch from worldwide assets.78 The court concluded that Philippine
foreign exchange controls in no way prevented Citibank from repaying
deposits as long as it used assets of its non-Philippine branches. 9
Citibank appealed the district court's ruling to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.' On remand, the district court found New York
to have the greater interest in the controversy, thus, it ruled, New York
law governed.8 The court reasoned that New York had the dominant
75. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
76. See Wells Fargo, 612 F. Supp. at 357 (indicating that the place of perfor-
mance, and therefore situs of the deposit, was in New York because the confirmation
slip required repayment of the Eurodollar deposit there).
77. Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 947.
78. Id. at 950.
79. Id. at 948-49. The Philippine law expert for Wells Fargo argued as follows:
1) MAAB No. 47 does not apply to the repayment of deposits with non-Philippine
assets for branches of non-Philippine banks such as Citibank; 2) Citibank may repay
Wells Fargo's deposit from assets located at its non-Philippine branches without prior
approval from the Central Bank of the Philippines; 3) branches of banks are not
separate legal entities under Philippine law so that obligations incurred by a branch
are obligations of the bank as a whole; 4) the obligation of a bank under a deposit
contract is a general debt of the bank under Philippine law, and may be repaid out
of any of the bank's assets; and therefore 5) Citibank's obligation under Philippine
law is not limited to assets of its Manila branch. Id.
80. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988) (re-
manding the case back to federal district court).
81. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450, 1453-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). The court first determined which conflict of laws rule applied to
this case. Id. Because the court asserted jurisdiction on both diversity and federal
question grounds, the New York conflict of laws doctrine and the federal common
law rules concerning choice of law controlled the case. Id. at 1454. The court con-
cluded that under either approach, the law of the jurisdiction which had the greatest
interest in the litigation should be applied. Id.
By finding that New York law controlled, the court avoided applying the act of
state doctrine. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964)
(holding that United States courts will not inquire into the validity of public acts
committed by a recognized foreign sovereign within its own territory). The classic act
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interest in the controversy because New York is a major financial center
and serves as the chief clearinghouse for United States dollar financial
transactions.' It also reasoned that New York law should apply to Eu-
rodollar transactions so depositors and banks can avoid the cost and
uncertainty of determining how another country's law affects repayment
of Eurodollar deposits.'
Under New York law, the court held that a bank's home office is
liable for the obligations of its branch offices." The court stated, how-
ever, that a foreign government's expropriation of a depositor's assets
would function as a compulsory assignment of the depositor's rights and
thus would serve to discharge the bank's debt to the depositor." When,
of state doctrine rested on the principle of comity and required sovereign nations to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and for courts to respect the
acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their territories. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The Supreme Court shifted the act of state doctrine's basis in
Sabbatino by grounding the doctrine on the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. The court required that the judiciary not interfere in the executive's conduct
of foreign policy, even if there had been a definite transgression of international law.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423-24, 430-33. In applying the act of state doctrine, the court
determines where the deposit is located, which law governs the deposit, and whether
the decree or event in the foreign country affects the deposit in the dispute. Margaret
E. Tahyar, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86
COLrM. L. REV. 594, 611-13 (1986).
82. Wells Fargo, 695 F. Supp. at 1454. The court determined from the confirma-
tion slips that repayment was required in New York. Id. at 1452. New York law was
deemed to apply under choice of law rules both because repayment was to be per-
formed in New York, and because New York had an overriding interest as a major
financial center in protecting the expectations of the parties to the deposit contract. Id.
at 1454 (citing J. Zeevi and Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d
168, 172-73 (N.Y. 1975)).
83. Id. at 1454.
84. Id. But see Chrzanowska v. Corn Exch. Bank. 159 N.Y.S. 385, 388 (1916),
affd, 122 N.E. 877 (N.Y. 1919) (holding that a bank is not required to honor a draft
drawn on another branch of the same bank). For its decision, the court relies on the
separate entity doctrine which allows a wholly incorporated branch of a bank to be
treated as a separate person for certain legal purposes. Id. Courts however often make
exceptions to the separate entity doctrine. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that the United States
home office of the Chase Manhattan Bank was liable for the deposits of its Vietnam
branch when the branch closed prior to the fall of Saigon).
85. Wells Fargo, 695 F. Supp. at 1454-55. When a foreign sovereign confiscates
the assets of a foreign branch of an American bank, the act of state doctrine applies,
and requires a United States court to restrain itself from reviewing the act of the
foreign sovereign that compelled the assignment of the deposit. Id. See supra note 81
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however, the foreign sovereign did not expropriate, but merely condi-
tioned the repayment of deposits on Central Bank approval, the world-
wide assets of the bank remained available to satisfy the depositor's
demand for repayment.' Citibank's impossibility defense failed because
Citibank had not sought the Philippine Central Bank's approval to repay
Wells Fargo's debt from the assets of its non-Philippine branchesY
Throughout the litigation, Citibank urged the courts to find that par-
ties who deposit funds at a foreign branch of an American bank assume
the risk that the foreign government may later restrict withdrawals.88
Citibank presented evidence that Wells Fargo had assumed the risk of
Philippine sovereign interference with the deposit repayment in exchange
for a higher interest return,89 and therefore, the deposit was redeemable
only at Citibank's Manila office and was subject to Philippine law.' ° In
support of a federal policy placing sovereign risk on depositors, Citibank
cited federal banking rules providing that banking reserves were not
required on deposits payable only outside the United States.9 Citibank
(defining and discussing the implications of the act of state doctrine in cases regard-
ing foreign deposits).
86. Wells Fargo Asia, 695 F. Supp. at 1455.
87. Id. (asserting that a depositor's demand on a bank to repay a deposit might
be frustrated, thereby allowing an impossibility defense for the bank.)
88. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 353, 356
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (relying on the expert testimony of Ian Giddy, a professor of interna-
tional finance at the New York University Graduate School of Business, to support
the notion that the depositor assumes the sovereign risk associated with the country
where the deposit is placed).
89. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946, 950 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (stating that the higher interest paid on Eurodollar deposits located in the Phil-
ippines, and the exemption of Eurodollar deposits from reserve requirements under
Regulation D, indicates that Wells Fargo willingly assumed the sovereign risk associ-
ated with its deposit in the Philippines). See supra note 40 (discussing how Regula-
tion D affects Eurodollar deposits); supra note 61 (defining sovereign risk, and identi-
fying those sovereign risks associated with any Eurodollar deposit).
90. Wells Fargo, 612 F. Supp. at 353, 356. The argument concerning sovereign
risk was rejected at oral argument prior to the district court's trial decision. Wells
Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 950.
91. See Wells Fargo, 660 F. Supp. at 950 (noting that Treasury Regulation D
exempts from reserve requirements deposits payable at foreign branches of American
banks that are not carrying the specific guaranty of repayment in the United States);
supra note 40 (explaining that Eurodollars are exempt from reserve requirements un-
der Regulation D); supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that Eurodollars
are exempt from reserve requirements to allow American banks to compete on a
equal basis with other foreign banks in the Eurodollar market).
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also cited its own "Terms and Conditions" sent to Wells Fargo after ac-
cepting its funds, which stated that a customer placing a deposit in one
of Citibank's foreign branches assumed the risk that the foreign country
may restrict withdrawals.' These arguments failed to persuade the
court, which held that depositors do not assume sovereign risk absent
clear and express agreement."'
B. LIBYAN ARAB FOREIGN BANK V. BANKERS TRUST Co.
Disputes over Eurodollar deposits also arose between certain American
banks and the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, a bank owned by the Libyan
government.' Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co. tested
whether the British courts would apply United States law to Eurodollar
deposits located outside the United States consistent with Wells Fargo."
In late 1985, the United States and Libya approached open conflict
because of Libya's alleged support of international terrorists. On Janu-
92. Wells Fargo, 612 F. Supp. at 354. The "Terms and Conditions" provided in
part: "The bank shall have no responsibility for or liability to the undersigned [depos-
itor] for . . . the unavailability of such funds due to restrictions on convertibility,
requisitions, involuntary transfers, distraints of any character .. or other similar
causes beyond the bank's control." Id.
93. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 695 F. Supp. 1450, 1452-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that the deposit contract failed to specify the place of col-
lection, and that the court could find no custom or usage in the Eurodollar deposit
market on which to imply such a term).
94. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728 (1987);
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 1989 1 Lloyd's Rep.
608 (Q.B.).
95. See Libyan Arab, 1989 Q.B. at 761 (citing G.M. GOODE PAYMENT OBLIGA-
TlIONS IN COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, 120 (1983)) (suggesting that
British courts would give extraterritorial effect to a United States executive order
freezing a foreign government's Eurodollar deposits because Eurodollar payments are
necessarily made through the international clearing system in the United States).
96. See President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Issues, N.Y.
TiMES, Jan. 8, 1986, at A6 (asserting that Libya's publicly proclaimed material sup-
port of international terrorist groups who had attacked United States citizens directly
involved Libya in acts of armed aggression against the United States). In December
1986, terrorists groups, believed to be receiving assistance from Libya, attacked El Al
Israel airline counters in Rome and Vienna, where they killed eighteen and wounded
more than one hundred. U.S. Accuses Libya of Aiding Gunmen in Airport Raids, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 31, 1985, at Al. The United States believed that Libya was actively sup-
porting Abu Nidul's international terrorist organization, which was linked to the De-
cember 27th attack on the El Al check-in counters at the Rome and Vienna airports.
See Text of the State Department Report in Libya Under Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
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ary 8, 1986 President Reagan froze all property of the Libyan govern-
ment and its central bank in the United States or under the control of
United States persons; this action included overseas branches of
American banks." A wholly-owned subsidiary of the Central Bank of
Libya, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (Libyan Bank), owned an account
at the London branch of Bankers Trust Company (Bankers Trust).98
Because President Reagan's order applied to Bankers Trust's London
branch under United States law, Bankers Trust refused to repay Libyan
Bank's Eurodollar deposit." When Libyan Bank sued in the British
courts, the British court applied British law and ruled in favor of Lib-
ya.100
Bank deposits create contracts between banks and depositors under
British law, as under United States law.'0' Libyan Bank's call depos-
9, 1986, at A6 (stating that the President of Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, supported
terrorist activities worldwide). This United States government attack on Libyan foreign
policy followed a long series of terrorist activity, ranging from hijacking a TWA jet
in Athens and exploding a bomb in Germany's Frankfurt airport, to hijacking the Ital-
ian cruise ship "Achille Lauro" off Egypt's coast. Number of Terrorist Attacks in
1985 Up Sharply; Hijackings Alone Leave 62 Dead, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1985, at
24.
97. See Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1987), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1991). The President delegated his authority for blocking a foreign nation's
assets to the Treasury Department. Id. The Presidential order blocked various catego-
ries of assets of the Libyan government and its central bank, including the assets
"that are or hereafter come within the possession and control of [United States] per-
sons including overseas branches of [United States] persons." Id. This language in-
cluded foreign branches of American banks not separately incorporated, but excluded
foreign subsidiaries of American banks. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at
752, n.74. The Treasury Department subsequently issued detailed regulations to en-
dorse the order. 31 C.F.R. § 500 to 575 (1991).
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) gives the President
the power to declare a national emergency and prescribe other regulations which will
restrict granting credit or making payments among banking institutions that deal with
foreign countries when the United States faces any exceptional threat to national secu-
rity, foreign policy, or the economy from abroad. International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1993). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of IEEPA. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
98. Libyan Arab, 1989 Q.B. at 731.
99. Id. at 732-33, 742-43.
100. Id. at 748, 774.
101. See id. at 748 (describing a bank's obligation to its depositor as a species of
debt governed by express and implied terms of contract). The court further found that
the depositor could not sue on the debt alone. Id. at 749. The depositor must first
make a proper demand for repayment. Id. Notwithstanding, the bank's obligation to
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it"° with Bankers Trust, like most Eurodollar deposits before 1986,"
had not been extensively documented."° The call deposit documenta-
tion failed to indicate an appropriate governing law or place of payment;
nor did it clearly allocate sovereign risk between the parties."
The court found that performance under the deposit contract would be
excused either if it were illegal under the proper law of the contract or
if it required an illegal act in a foreign and friendly country." The
court held that because the deposit contract failed to specify a choice of
governing law, the law of the place where the account was situated
should govern the deposit." General banking practice makes clear that
banks repay deposits from their general assets; they do not return any
specific assets to their customers." When a branch refuses to repay a
deposit on a customer's proper demand, however, that customer may sue
the bank wherever the customer can obtain jurisdiction."
Eurodollar deposits are typically repaid through CHIPSW or
Fedwire,'" but they can also be repaid through a banker's draft, pay-
repay could be frustrated. Id. This outlook is similar to that found in United States
law. Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 164 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1928).
102. See supra note 24 (defining Eurodollar call deposits).
103. Supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (noting that most Eurodollar depos-
it documentation, until 1986, failed to specify governing law or place of repayment).
104. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (indicating that only after 1986
did most Eurodollar deposit documentation issued by American banks specify govern-
ing law or place of repayment).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 743.
107. See i. at 746 (citing, among others, X.A.G. v. A Bank, [19831 2 All E.R.
464, which held that a New York grand jury could not legally subpoena confidential
bank records maintained in London). Similar precedents exist within United States
law. See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U.S. 253, 256 (1927) (finding that a
deposit placed with a Viennese bank remained subject to Austria-Hungarian law);
Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164. 1167 n.2 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 496
U.S. 912 (1990) (stating that a deposit placed in a Vietnamese branch of an Ameri-
can bank was subject to Vietnamese law).
108. See 5A NIcHE ON BANKS AND BANKu G, ch. 9, §§ 1, 4b (1983 & Supp.
1993) (explaining that deposits constitute general obligations of a bank).
109. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728, 748-49.
Similar precedent exists under United States law. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 459 U.S. 976 (1982)
(holding the home office of an American bank liable for the deposits of its Vietnam-
ese branch when the branch closed prior to the fall of Saigon).
110. See supra note 31 (describing CHIPS and its use in settling Eurodollar pay-
ments).
111. See supra note 32 (describing Fedwire and its use in settling Eurodollar pay-
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ment order, or other means."' The court found that because there was
neither an express, nor an implied term in the deposit agreement requir-
ing repayment through CHIPS or Fedwire, there was no potential illegal-
ity in the United States under President Reagan's Executive Order." '3
The court rejected other methods of payment for various reasons."'
The court found that Bankers Trust could have repaid Libyan Bank's
call deposit in cash notes in either United States dollars or its sterling
equivalent, even though this method of repayment was extremely im-
practical, costly, and time-consuming."5 Consequently, the Libyan Bank
was held to be entitled to recover $131 million United States dollars
from Bankers Trust."6
The court's decision affirmed the principle that the law of the place
where the Eurodollar deposit is booked governs the deposit. Through a
conflict of laws analysis, the court limited the extraterritorial reach of
any freeze or blocking order issued by the United States. The court's
decision also effectively reinforced the underlying rationale of the Euro-
dollar market. Depositors place United States dollars on deposit with
banks outside the United States, in part, so that the United States gov-
ernment cannot confiscate or freeze them.
Private commercial banks, the United States Government, and the
courts are all confused about the proper law governing Eurodollar de-
posits. That the United States and British courts reached inconsistent
decisions in the foregoing cases reflects the confusion that exists in the
law governing Eurodollar deposits."7 Bankers echo similar uncertainty
ments).
112. See supra note 33-37 (describing other payment mechanisms and their use in
settling Eurodollar payments).
113. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, 1989 Q.B. at 762. Although the court concluded
that both CHIPS and Fedwire required action in .the United States, the court still
questioned whether those actions would in fact be unlawful. Id.
114. Id. at 752-55, 761-66. The court rejected as unacceptable payment through an
in-house transfer at Bankers Trust London, a correspondent bank transfer, a banker's
draft drawn on a London bank, a banker's payment order drawn on New York, use
of the London dollar clearing system, use of other clearing systems outside the United
States, and Eurodollar certificates of deposits. Id.
115. Id. at 755, 764. But see, Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 758-59
(suggesting that cash payment in United States dollars may have violated United
States Treasury regulations).
116. Libyan Arab, 1989 Q.B. at 774.
117. Compare Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding that Chase Manhattan was not obligated to repay the plaintiff's Eurodollar
deposit that was located in its Cuban branch after the Cuban government had confis-
376 [VOL. 9:1
1993) EURODOLLAR DEPOSIT MARKET 377
about the proper law governing Eurodollar deposits."' The United
States Government has also taken conflicting positions. The Federal
Reserve Bank argued for applying Philippine law in Wells Fargo,"'
but the United States Treasury Department joined Bankers Trust in
arguing for the application of New York law in Libyan Arab."z
At a more fundamental level, the courts of several nations have dis-
agreed on a single governing law," and courts in the United Kingdom
and the United States have refused to hold, as a matter of law, that
depositors assume the sovereign risk associated with their Eurodollar
deposits. " The Federal Reserve Bank now requires United States
banks to write into their confirmation slips for Eurodollar deposits an
appropriate choice of foreign governing law, and to restrict payment to
cated Chase Manhattan's Cuban branch's assets) with Garcia v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that Chase Manhattan was obligat-
ed to repay the plaintiff's Eurodollar deposit located in its Cuban branch after the
Cuban government confiscated Chase Manhattan's Cuban branch's assets). These two
courts reached exactly opposite conclusions on essentially similar facts within two
days of one another. Compare Perez, 463 N.E.2d at 5 (decided on March 30, 1984);
with Garcia, 735 F.2d at 645 (decided on March 28, 1984).
118. See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturer's Hanover Bank Trust Co.,
[1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 608, 614 (Q.B.) (revealing that although Manufacturer's
Hanover pressed the British courts to apply United States law in its dispute with
Libyan Bank, it had already modified its Eurodollar deposit contracts by selecting
British law to govern Eurodollar deposits at its London branch). In the words of the
court:
'Thus, we are confronted with the extraordinary anomaly that
[Manufacturer's Hanover] relfies] on a stamped deposit [restricting pay-
ment to its London branch and choosing English law to govern the
deposit] to avoid potentially dire financial consequences to them of freez-
es outside the United States, but resist [Libyan Bank's] reliance on the
self-same stamp to avoid similar consequences to [Libyan Bank] from the
imposition of the [United States] freeze:'
Id. at 621.
119. Memorandum of Law of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (amicus
curiae), Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A, 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(No. 84 Civ. 0996 (WK)), quoted in Libyan Arab, 1989 Q.B. at 741.
120. Smedresman and Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 754.
121. See supra notes 113-120 (showing cases in which countries, including the
United States, the United Kingdom, Cuba, Libya, and the Philippines chose differing
positions on which locality's law ought to govern in the event that a sovereign con-
fiscates the funds of a bank's foreign branch).
122. See Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that a depositor does not assume the risk of arbitrary state confisca-
tion); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1989 Q.B. 728 (1987) (same).
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their foreign branches.I" The Eurodollar market, therefore, is not uni-
formly subject to the regulatory power of the United States. In the ab-
sence of a governing law clause in a deposit contract, the law of the
country where the bank that has accepted the Eurodollar deposit is locat-
ed applies.
Individual countries have no incentive to regulate the Eurodollar mar-
ket. Any nation that regulates the Eurodollar deposits located at banks
and bank branches within its territory merely raises the cost to banks of
holding these deposits. Banks in turn will necessarily lower the yields
offered to depositors. Lower yields, however, create an incentive for
depositors to seek banks in other jurisdictions, where the market remains
unregulated and the deposit yields are correspondingly higher.'" Conse-
quently, the Eurodollar market remains an unregulated market world-
wide.
III. TRANSNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
United States dollars located outside the territory of the United States
have become a species of truly transnational, or state-less currency be-
cause they are not uniformly subject to United States law. Although the
problems posed by Eurodollar deposits could be resolved by eliminating
this market, the time for this has long passed."z The United States
government cannot forcibly repatriate its offshore dollars, if only be-
cause governments, corporations, and international organizations use the
Eurodollar market extensively for financing international trade and eco-
nomic development." At this time, therefore, only transnational efforts
by private parties and governments can order and regulate the Eurodollar
123. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., (1989] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 608, 628 (Q.B.) (stating that after 1986, and under pressure from the
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, Manufacturer's Hanover placed specific
wording in its confirmation slips stating that banks placing Eurodollar deposits with
its London branch chose English law and agreed to be repaid only at its London
branch). The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States apparently pressured all
American banks to do likewise. Id.
124. See Rupert Pennent-Rea, A Survey of Central Banking: The Skippers, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 22, 1984, at 23 (stating that dozens of smaller countries would race to
allow unregulated offshore banking if existing financial centers discouraged it).
125. See id. at 23 (stating that once the global finance market was opened, it
could not be closed).
126. See Cook, supra note 6, at 6-9 (citing statistics which indicate that the size
and scope of the international capital markets and international capital flows promote
international trade and economic development).
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deposit market.
A. UNIFORM CUSTOM AND PRACTICE FOR EURODOLLAR DEosTs
As early as the 1920s, the world banking community recognized that
banks and their customers needed uniform procedures to govern their
use of commercial letters of credit to finance international trade.'27 In
response to the problems associated with using commercial letters of
credit, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) drafted the Uni-
form Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP). The
ICC successfully persuaded international banks to adopt the UCP for
governing transactions with respect to documentary letters of credit.'"
Although not required by law, when the parties have agreed to adopt the
UCP, the courts have generally followed the conventions of the UCP in
resolving documentary letter of credit disputes.'" The UCP has been so
successful that various states in the United States have enacted the UCP
into positive law."' Eventually, it may become accepted as customary
127. David J. Kalson, Note, The International Monetary Fund Agreement and Let-
ters of Credit: A Balancing of Purposes, 44 U. PrIT. L. REV. 1061. 1066 (1983)
128. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTIC-
Es FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDrrs (1983) (ICC Publication No. 400). In 1926, the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce, located in Paris, France. began studying documen-
tary credits and eventually drafted procedures for their handling. Kalson, supra note
127, at 1066. The original ICC committee report was published in 1930 as the "Uni-
form Regulations for Commercial Documentary Credits." d. In 1933. the ICC re-
viewed and finalized its recommendations as the "Uniform Customs and Practice for
Commercial Documentary Credits." I& The most recent edition was revised and ac-
cepted in 1983. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF CO.MMERCE. supra.
129. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 796-97 (indicating that
many international banks have accepted the code and generally cite it in letter of
credit documentation as governing the issuance of documentary credits); Egon
Guttman, U.C.C. Article 5 Symposium: Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Cred-
it: Moving Toward a Uniform Approach, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 167, 172 (1990)
(noting that the ICC succeeded in developing rules to govern documentary letters of
credit).
130. See Christopher Leon, Letters of Credit: A Primer, 45 MD. L REV. 432, 439
(1986) (indicating that New York. Missouri, Alabama, and Arizona have all enacted
into their commercial statutes a provision stating that article five of the UCC will not
apply when a letter of credit transaction is subject to the Uniform Commercial Proce-
dures for Documentary Credits).
131. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(0 (McKinney 1964) (exempting a documenta-
ry credit from the normal provisions of Article 5 of the UCC if the letter of credit is
governed by the UCP).
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international law. 32
Just as the ICC drafted the UCP to promote international trade,"
privately codifying procedures for Eurodollar deposits" will create pre-
dictability and thereby further promote the growth and development of
the Eurodollar deposit market. The ICC could take account of the ex-
pectations of bank and depositor, select what expectations are reason-
able, and convert these expectations into clear operating rules.
In addition, just as banks may cite the UCP for proving "custom and
practice" with respect to documentary letter of credit transactions,"
they may eventually be able to cite a UCP-type convention for proving
trade usage or custom with respect to Eurodollar deposits."' In Wells
Fargo, Citibank failed to persuade the court that by custom and practice
in the Eurodollar deposit market depositors assume sovereign risk.'37
Had an UCP-type convention existed for Eurodollar deposits to which
Citibank could have referred to prove usage or custom with respect to
sovereign risk, Citibank would more likely have persuaded the court of
its position, or avoided a lawsuit with Wells Fargo altogether.
B. CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION
If a UCP-type convention represents a private solution for creating
operating procedures for the Eurodollar deposit market, the Basel
Supervisors' Committee (BSC)"' represents the governments' best ap-
132. Leon, supra note 130, at 439.
133. Christopher Leon, Letter of Credit: A Primer, 45 MD. L. REV. 432, 439
(1986).
134. Leon, supra note 130, at 440.
135. Leon, supra note 133, at 440.
136. See Smedresman and Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 796 (implying that courts
would be persuaded by custom and practice with respect to Eurodollar deposits if
deposit procedures were codified in writing and adopted by a majority of banks).
137. Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v. Citibank N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see supra note 88-93 and accompanying text (discussing Citibank's failed at-
tempt to prove that Wells Fargo assumed the sovereign risk associated with the
bank's Eurodollar deposit in Manila).
138. See generally J.J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on
Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," 23 INT'L L. 245, 247-49 (1989) (ex-
plaining that after the 1974 collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany, the
governors of the central banks expanded their cooperation by forming the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices (BSC)). These banks were
comprised of the "Group of Ten", or "G-10 Group", of the Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Switzerland. Id. The OECD .is a con-
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proach to regulating this market. The BSC encourages member central
banks to equalize their regulations and supervisory practices, recom-
mends actions on specific issues to central bank supervisors, and allows
,central bankers to exchange information on policy and supervisory prac-
tices. 39 Since the 1970s, the central banks of the economically devel-
oped countries, through the BSC, have increasingly cooperated with one
another in pursuing international monetary policies." In the 1970s,
when it recognized the growing importance of international banking, the
BSC recommended coordinating supervisory oversight of international
banks. 4'
sultative body that informs its twenty-four Western industrialized nation members on
issues of economic importance. Id. at 248 n.16. Ten of the OECD countries formed
the Group of Ten to coordinate lending under the General Agreement to Borrow
(GAB) as implemented by decision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Id.
From these beginnings, the G-10 Group has expanded the scope of its consultations to
embrace broader issues of economic policy, and has arranged for its finance ministers
and central bankers to meet regularly with the IMF, OECD, and the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements. Id
139. Norton, supra note 138, at 249.
140. See Pennent-Rea, supra note 124. at 24-29, (indicating that as the global
economy became more integrated in the 1970s, the world's central bankers were
forced to coordinate their policies). But see Cook, supra note 6, at 24-30 (describing
how central banks have experienced greater difficulty coordinating monetary and ex-
change rate policies since the 1980s).
Such cooperation is generally secret and unseen; only on rare occasions is the
public given any indication that it even exists. See Norton, supra note 138, at 249-50
(stating that the G-10 Group central bankers cooperated in secret when they formed
the BSC, and distributed the BSC's first report on foreign bank supervision only to
central bank members).
In September 1992, public disagreement between the Bank of London and the
Bundesbank followed London's withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ERM). See Corrigan and Tucker, supra note 10, at 6 (describing how the Bank
of England was forced to withdraw the pound from the European ERM after unsuc-
cessfully defending its exchange rate in the international currency markets); see also
supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the European Exchange Rate Mech-
anism (ERM)). The Bundesbank's public remarks concerning its minimal support for
the English pound may have spurred speculative selling against it. thus causing the
pound to fall out of the ERM band. See Bank of England Criticizes Bundesbank FIN.
TI s, Oct. 6, 1992, at I (reporting that the Bank of England had openly criticized
the Bundesbank, thus violating the usual central bank secrecy).
141. Pennant-Rea, supra note 124, at 55. The Basle Concordat of 1974. which set
forth the basic guidelines for such coordination, was later revised after the failure of
the Italian Bank Ambrosiano in 1983. See id. (stating that after the collapse of Banco
Ambrosiano Holdings, the BSC revised its original bank supervisory recommendations
and placed greater emphasis on the overlapping responsibilities of central banks in
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The BSC's initial success led it to recommend other actions for cen-
tral bankers and bank supervisors.4 ' Most important among these was
the BSC's achievement in equalizing bank capital adequacy stan-
dards.'13 Beginning in 1982, the Committee devoted nearly six years to
developing its recommendations.1" Concerned not only with the stabili-
ty of the financial system, the BSC and its member countries' govern-
ments also increasingly sought to create a level playing field for banks
competing in the international arena. 45 Uniform capital adequacy stan-
dards became a greater priority in the late 1980s, when both banks and
regulators worried that major banks might default on their obligations
because of the international debt crisis and the various domestic lending
emergencies.'" By 1990, the United States, based on the recommenda-
tions of the BSC, had adopted new capital adequacy standards for banks
into its regulatory scheme.' 7
supervising international banks). The collapse of Banco Ambrosiano resulted in losses
of $450 million for some two hundred and fifty banks which held assets in the failed
bank. Id The guidelines for cooperation were revised again following BCCI's failure
in 1991. Bank Supervision: Over the Hills and Far Away, ECONOMIST, July 11, 1992,
at 72. The closure of BCCI led to the loss of $10 billion for many banks and depos-
itors worldwide. Id.
142. See Norton, supra note 138, at 254-55 (stating that the BSC issued reports
on foreign exchange, bank secrecy, political risk analysis, and risk analysis for
off-balance sheet products).
143. See Norton, supra note 138, at 262 (stating that the BSC's work on capital
adequacy standards was eventually accepted by the central banks of the G-10 Group).
Of the Committee's reports, the report on bank capital adequacy standards had the
most significant impact on international regulatory laws. Id. at 252.
144. See Norton, supra note 138, at 253-59 (describing how the July 1988 Report
resulted after six years of research, study, and negotiation among the BSC's mem-
bers). During the first two years, the BSC studied bank capital adequacy standards
and discovered that a great diversity existed among the various national systems for
measuring bank capital and setting capital adequacy standards. Id. at 253. The Com-
mittee began work in June 1982, but did not issue its final report until July 1988,
despite the importance and urgency, of equalizing capital adequacy standards world-
wide. Id. at 253-59. The Federal Reserve felt the United States Congress had firmly
mandated that the Federal Reserve equalize capital adequacy standards for banks. Id.
at 255. Consequently, the Federal Reserve signed a bilateral accord with the United
Kingdom on January 8, 1987 in order to pressure the BSC into finalizing its recom-
mendations on bank capital adequacy standards. Id. at 256.
145. Norton, supra note 138, at 253.
146. 12 C.F.R. sec. 225 app. A (1992); see 54 Fed. Reg. 4, 186 (1989) (stating
that the proposed revised capital adequacy standards for banks were based on the
recommendations of the Basel Supervisors' Committee).
147. 12 C.F.R. § 208.13, app. A to § 208 app. A, to § 225 (1992); see 54 Fed.
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The legal significance of the BSC's work is not that its recommenda-
tions are officially binding on member central banks." Rather, its rec-
ommendations generate significant legal activity within member
countries' regulatory agencies by providing a focal point around which
their actions may converge.' 9 The BSC's success with bank capital
adequacy standards, a cornerstone of prudential regulation of world
capital markets, should be followed by other measures creating consis-
tent regulation of the Eurodollar deposit market between major Eurodol-
lar financial centers."5
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the net result of major court decisions in
the 1980s concerning the Eurodollar market have effectively created a
new species of transnational currency. This transnational currency is not
only unregulated by any international authority, but also beyond the
regulatory reach of any single country. The Eurodollar market has weak-
ened control over national economic and monetary policy, thus creating
greater instability and volatility in exchange rates. Exchange rate
instability has created new uncertainties for those trading and investing
internationally. The existence of an unregulated Eurodollar deposit mar-
ket has also hindered governments in their fight against the illegal trade
in arms and drugs.
As the ills associated with this unregulated market are regularly visit-
Reg. 4,186 (1989) (stating that the proposed revised capital adequacy standards for
banks were based upon the BSC's recommendations).
148. See Norton, supra note 138, at 249 (quoting the second Chairman of the
Committee, Governor of the Bank of England Peter Cooke, as stating that the Com-
mittee lacked formal supranational supervisory authority, and its recommendations,
therefore, have no legal force).
149. Norton, supra note 138, at 252. The BSC recommends supervisory guidelines
that incorporate the best practices, hoping that its member central banks will imple-
ment domestic regulations consistent with the Committee's recommendations. Id. at
249 n.20. Through these means, the Committee encourages every country's regulations
to converge on a common set of standards, thus alleviating the necessity of forcing
each central bank to adopt specific supervisory practices. Id.
150. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, TERROPSM AND INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS OF THE SENATE COM IrI.TE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DRUG MONEY LAuNDTER-
INO, BANKS, AND FOREIGN POLICY, S. REP. No. 101-104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1990) (reporting that the G-10 Group of central bank governors had all endorsed the
BSC's recommendations to prevent drug traffickers from abusing the banking system
by encouraging banks to identify customers, cooperate with law enforcement agencies,
and comply fully with money laundering laws).
19931
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ed upon national economies, governments should reach a consensus on
regulating the Eurodollar deposit market in the best interests of the
global economy. The ICC should establish uniform procedures for Euro-
dollar deposits that could be adopted by private commercial banks
worldwide. The BSC should build on the success of its recommenda-
tions for setting bank capital adequacy standards by creating recommen-
dations for harmonizing banking regulations with respect to the Eurodol-
lar deposit market.
Although the Cold War finally ended in 1991, its impact for good
and evil lives on in various guises. The birth and growth of the Euro-
dollar deposit market has brought with it not only expanding internation-
al trade and economic development, but also an unregulated form of
transnational currency beyond national-level regulation. Courts have
failed to agree on a single legal system within which to order and regu-
late the Eurodollar deposit market. They have not recognized the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of United States law with respect to United States
dollars on deposit in banks outside the territory of the United States.
Nevertheless, other international measures are possible, and should be
used, to control and regulate the Eurodollar deposit market.
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